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1  |  INTRODUC TION
In view of the climate crisis, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and decarbonizing all sectors of the economy have become 
imperative. Thus, the European Union (EU) has introduced a legal 
and policy framework to promote the use of energy from renewable 
sources.1 Its core instrument, the Renewable Energy Directive (RED 
I),2 seeks to prioritize the use of biofuels to reduce GHG emissions in 
the transport sector. However, the ‘initial enthusiasm’ over biofuels 
subsided soon in light of their ‘considerable environmental and social 
costs’.3 In this context, a particularly thorny issue has been GHG 
emissions resulting from indirect land-use change (ILUC).
 1Highlighting the inherent tensions in EU climate and energy governance, C Dupont, K 
Kulovesi and H van Asselt, ‘Editorial: Governing the EU’s Climate and Energy Transition 
through the 2030 Framework’ (2020) 29 Review of European, Comparative and 
International Environmental Law 147, 147.
 2Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC [2009] OJ L140/16 (RED I).
 3A Mignolli, The European Union and Sustainable Development: A Study on Unilateral Trade 
Measures (Edizioni Nuova Cultura 2018) 230.
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New European Union (EU) rules on biofuels have led to mounting tensions between 
the EU and some of its trading partners. A particularly contentious measure is the 
‘freeze and phase-out’ of certain biofuels in the transport sector with a high indirect 
land-use change risk, as introduced by the recast of the Renewable Energy Directive. 
In light of Indonesia’s recent move to initiate proceedings against the EU at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), this article systematically explores relevant key concepts 
of WTO law and analyses the compatibility of the EU measures with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement). While the EU measures are carefully crafted to avoid poten-
tial WTO pitfalls—such as applicability of the TBT Agreement—the article identifies 
several critical aspects that raise doubts about the measure’s compatibility with WTO 
law. In particular, the seemingly deliberate targeting of palm oil casts doubt on the 
justification of the measure on environmental grounds.
The recent recast of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II) 
takes a new approach to addressing such emissions.4 The relevant 
provisions provide for a ‘freeze and phase-out’ of biofuels, which 
pose a high risk of indirect land-use change and are therefore asso-
ciated with significant GHG emissions. The measure is principally 
origin-neutral and does not impose an import ban on the biofuels 
covered. Instead, it limits the extent to which these biofuels can be 
taken into account when calculating Member States’ consumption 
of renewable energy. However, based on the criteria laid down in a 
Delegated Regulation, palm oil—which is virtually not produced in 
the EU—is the only crop yielding high ILUC-risk biofuel and thus 
subject to the freeze and phase-out. For palm oil producers, the 
(economic) effects of this freeze and phase-out will be significant.
Indonesia—the world’s largest palm oil producer and exporter5—
thus pushed ahead with proceedings at the World Trade Organization 
 4Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources [2018] OJ L328/82 (RED II).
 5See, for example, V Voora et al, ‘Global Market Report: Palm Oil’ (International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2019) 2.
RECIEL. 2021;30:233–248.   | 233wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/reel
Abstract
(WTO) targeting the new EU rules on biofuels in March 2020.6 
Indonesia does not only question the effectiveness of the new EU 
legislation in terms of sustainability but also argues that it unfairly sin-
gles out palm oil and thus violates WTO law.7 Other palm-oil-produc-
ing countries, like Malaysia, Colombia or Costa Rica, have expressed 
similar concerns and have joined the proceedings as third parties.8
Against this background, this article analyses the contentious 
EU measure under WTO law. After briefly addressing the issue of 
biofuels and land-use change (Section 2), we trace the develop-
ment of the relevant legal provisions under EU law and explain the 
freeze and phase-out mechanism (Section 3). The focus then lies 
on the compatibility of the EU measure with key obligations under 
WTO law (Sections 4–6). While we find that the measure does not 
constitute a ‘technical regulation’ and therefore does not fall 
within the scope of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement),9 we find that it is likely to be inconsistent with 
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).10 Moreover, in light of the legislative process that led to 
the adoption of the contentious EU measure, we are sceptical 
whether the measure in its current form can be saved under Article 
XX of the GATT.
2  |  BIOFUEL S AND L AND -USE CHANGE
In light of efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change, biofu-
els have been increasingly employed as a substitute for fuels pro-
duced from non-renewable sources (i.e. fossil fuels), whose use is 
generally associated with higher GHG emissions.11 Until now, bi-
ofuels produced from food and feed crops (‘first-generation bio-
fuels’ or ‘crop-based biofuels’) account for the largest part of 
biofuels used.12 The rapid growth of their production has raised a 
number of concerns, for instance regarding food security.13 
 6European Union – Certain Measures Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels 
(Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Indonesia) WT/DS593/9 (24 March 2020) 
(EU – Palm Oil, Request for the Establishment of a Panel). While the panel has been 
established on 29 July 2020, the dispute is still pending at the time of writing.
 7ibid.
 8See <https://www.wto.org/engli sh/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds593_e.htm>.
 9Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 
January 1995) 1868 UNTS 120 (TBT Agreement).
 10General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 187.
 11Note, however, that the actual GHG impact of biofuels depends among others on the 
raw material and production methods used. See further Y Daman et al, ‘An Introduction 
to Biofuels, Foods, Livestock, and the Environment’ in D Verma et al (eds), Biomass, 
Biopolymer-Based Materials, and Bioenergy (Woodhead Publishing 2019) 241.
 12The so-called advanced biofuels have so far not been economically viable; see W 
Douma, ‘Legal Aspects of the European Union's Biofuels Policy: Protection or 
Protectionism’ (2010) 53 German Yearbook of International Law 371, 374. For an 
overview of the different shares of biofuels, see the summary of the Renewables 2019 
report of the International Energy Agency: <https://www.iea.org/repor ts/renew ables 
-2019/trans port#abstract>.
 13See, for example, G Fischer et al, ‘Biofuels and Food Security’ (International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis 2009); C Hinkes, ‘Adding (Bio)fuel to the Fire: Discourses 
on Palm Oil Sustainability in the Context of European Policy Development’ (2020) 22 
Environment, Development and Sustainability 7661.
Moreover, the increased demand in crop-based biofuels leads to 
environmental problems, which casts doubt on their actual GHG-
saving potential.14
This increased demand builds pressure to use additional land 
for the cultivation of suitable crops.15 Such additional land is typi-
cally ‘created’ through conversion and deforestation of non-agri-
cultural land. This direct land-use change (DLUC) leads to additional 
GHG emissions, which affect the total GHG-saving potential of 
these biofuels.16 Additionally, increased demand in first-genera-
tion biofuels may also lead to indirect land-use change. This occurs 
when crops for biofuel production displace the existing cultivation 
of crops for food and feed purposes.17 Again, new agricultural land 
is ‘created’ for food or feed production. However, land conversion 
and deforestation are ‘geographically disconnected’ from the crop 
production for biofuels.18
GHG emissions resulting from ILUC are considered substantial 
and may even be larger than those of DLUC.19 Several studies have 
suggested that ILUC emissions may even thwart GHG savings of 
biofuels and lead to a net increase in emissions.20 However, due to 
the geographical disconnect, ILUC and its GHG emissions cannot 
be directly observed, measured or attributed.21 The quantification 
of GHG emissions from ILUC relies on complex modelling, often 
based on reactions in global agricultural markets to increasing de-
mand for biofuels.22 Differences in modelling choices and input 
data have led to methodological challenges and considerable varia-
tions in results.23 Thus, ILUC estimations are fraught with a high 
level of uncertainty, which must be taken into account when scru-
tinizing policy choices based on such estimates.
 14J Lin, ‘Governing Biofuels: A Principal-Agent Analysis of the European Union Biofuels 
Certification Regime and the Clean Development Mechanism’ (2012) 24 Journal of 
Environmental Law 43, 48ff.
 15Hinkes (n 13); C Gonzalez, ‘The Environmental Justice Implications of Biofuels’ (2016) 
20 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 229, 255.
 16See D Laborde, ‘Assessing the Land Use Change Consequences of European Biofuel 
Policies’ (International Food Policy Research Institute 2011).
 17Commission (EU), ‘Report on the Status of Production Expansion of Relevant Food and 
Feed Crops Worldwide’ COM(2019) 142 final, 13 March 2019 (Commission (EU), Food 
and Feed Crops Report) 3ff. Annex 1 of the report contains a review of current studies 
on the issue. See also Commission (EU), ‘Report on Indirect Land-Use Change Related to 
Biofuels and Bioliquids’ COM(2010) 811 final, 22 December 2010, 3.
 18See S Ahlgren and L Di Lucia, ‘Indirect Land Use Changes of Biofuel Production – A 
Review of Modelling Efforts and Policy Developments in the European Union’ (2014) 7 
Biotechnology for Biofuels 35, 1.
 19M Jansson and H Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road towards Sustainable Biofuels – EU and 
U.S. Approaches to Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental 
and Public Health Law 104, 132.
 20Gonzalez (n 15) 240.
 21Jansson and Kalimo (n 19) 133.
 22Ahlgren and Di Lucia (n 18) 2.
 23See S Tokgoz and D Laborde, ‘Indirect Land Use Change Debate: What Did We Learn?’ 
(2014) 1 Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports 104, 108.
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3  |  THE NE W EU RULES ON BIOFUEL S
3.1  |  Regulatory background
In 2009, RED I was part of the legislative package implementing the 
EU’s 2020 climate and energy policy. The directive aimed to reduce 
EU GHG emissions by enhancing the use of renewable energy 
sources. Thus, it introduced an overall target for the share of energy 
from renewable sources.24 In addition, it included a sub-target for 
the transport sector, which—given its fuel dependency—plays a stra-
tegic role in the EU’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions.25 With re-
gard to the issue of land-use change, RED I included sustainability 
criteria, which addressed some issues of DLUC.26 While the EU leg-
islator was aware of the problem of ILUC and anticipated necessary 
changes in the future,27 it decided to merely include reporting obli-
gations regarding ILUC in RED I.28
In 2015, an amendment to RED I, the ‘ILUC Directive’, addressed 
the issue in more detail.29 Given the complexities of ILUC, the EU 
legislator reached the following compromise solution: It limited the 
share of energy from biofuels produced from food crops, which 
could be taken into account when assessing Member States’ compli-
ance with the renewable energy target in the transport sector, to 
7%.30 At the same time, it exempted advanced biofuels, such as bio-
fuels from residual waste or algae, from that limit. Advanced biofuels 
are generally associated with no or low levels of ILUC emissions.31 
Their use was further incentivized by stipulating that they count 
‘double’ for complying with the transport sub-target.32 However, ac-
cording to the European Commission’s own assessment, ‘[t]he long 
and technically complex inter-institutional discussion on ILUC 
amendments created a considerable degree of uncertainty in the 
market, preventing investments in both food-based biofuels, as well 
as in advanced biofuels’.33
 24RED I (n 2) art 3(1).
 25ibid art 3(4).
 26J Lin, ‘Environmental Regulation of Biofuels: Limits of the Meta-Standard Approach’ 
(2011) 5 Carbon and Climate Law Review 34, 37ff. See also C Glinski, ‘Certification of the 
Sustainability of Biofuels in Global Supply Chains’ in P Rott (ed), Certification – Trust, 
Accountability, Liability (Springer 2019) 163.
 27For example, European Parliament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, 
‘Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources’, A6-0369/2008 (26 
September 2008) 173ff. See further EB Lydgate, ‘The EU, the WTO and Indirect 
Land-Use Change’ (2013) 47 Journal of World Trade 159, 163ff.
 28RED I (n 2) art 19(6). See E Pavlovskaia, ‘Legal Analysis of the European Union 
Sustainability Criteria for Biofuels’ (2014) 3 Journal of Sustainable Development and 
Policy 4, 12ff.
 29Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and 
diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources [2015] OJ L239/1.
 30ibid art 2(2)(b)(iv) Directive 2015/1513 (introducing art 3(4)(d) RED I).
 31For a nuanced sustainability appraisal of ‘second-generation biofuels’, see A Mohr and 
S Raman, ‘Lessons from First Generation Biofuels and Implications for the Sustainability 
Appraisal of Second Generation Biofuels’ (2013) 63 Energy Policy 114, 118.
 32Directive 2015/1513 (n 29) art 2(2)(b)(iv) (introducing art 3(4)(f) RED I).
 33Commission (EU), ‘REFIT Evaluation of the Directive 2009/28/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council‘ SWD(2016) 416 final, 30 November 2016, 29.
3.2  |  The RED II: A new attempt to address ILUC
Against this background, the recast of the Renewable Energy 
Directive for the post-2020 period presented a new opportunity 
to address the issue of ILUC. The Commission’s initial proposal 
largely followed the approach taken under RED I as amended by 
the ILUC Directive, providing for a cap on the share of crop-based 
biofuels counting towards Member States’ renewable energy tar-
gets in the transport sector. This cap would decrease from 7% to 
3.8% in 2030.34 In addition, it added the possibility for Member 
States to set a lower maximum share or to distinguish between 
different types of crop-based biofuels, for example, based on 
ILUC considerations.35 The proposal did not otherwise address 
ILUC in connection with biofuels but introduced a new minimum 
target for advanced biofuels to further incentivize and main-
stream their use.36
However, the European Parliament vehemently opposed the 
Commission’s approach. It had previously raised concerns that 
crop-derived biofuels could result in a net increase in GHG emissions 
when taking into account emissions from ILUC and had called on the 
EC to phase out palm oil, as a component of biofuels, preferably by 
2020.37 An amendment to the Commission’s proposal adopted by 
the Parliament in plenary thus provided for a general 7% ceiling for 
crop-based biofuels (without any reduction targets) but stated that 
‘[t]he contribution from biofuels … produced from palm oil shall be 0 
% from 2021’.38
In the trilogue phase of the legislative process, the issue of 
first-generation biofuels, including palm oil, remained highly political 
and very sensitive.39 From a trade policy perspective, the 
Parliament’s proposal was seen as ‘rais[ing] substantive concerns, in 
terms both of compatibility with the EU’s obligations in the [WTO] 
and of trade relations with palm oil producing countries’.40 Ultimately, 
the Parliament and the Council adopted RED II in December 2018. It 
contains what we term the ‘freeze and phase-out’, which is an at-
tempt to reconcile the various political demands with the EU’s obli-
gations under WTO law.
 34Commission (EU), ‘Proposal for a Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from 
Renewable Sources (Recast)’ COM(2016) 767 final/2, 30 November 2016, 24, art 7.
 35ibid. It is noteworthy that the proposed Article 7 did not contain any specific 
conditions for making such distinctions.
 36Commission (EU) (n 34) art 25.
 37European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 4 April 2017 on Palm Oil and Deforestation of 
Rainforests’ (2016/2222(INI)) paras 77–82.
 38European Parliament, ‘Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 
January 2018 on the proposal for a directive on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources (recast)’, P8_TA(2018)0009 (17 January 2018), amendment 307.
 39Council (EU), ‘General Secretariat Note of 3 May 2018 to Permanent Representatives 
Committee/Council’, Doc 8392/18, 2.
 40Letter from EC Director-General for Trade, Jean-Luc Demarty to EC Director-General 
for Energy, Dominique Ristori (March 2018) (a redacted version of this letter is on file 
with the authors). In the trilogue, the Council was also concerned about the WTO 
compatibility; see Council (EU), ‘General Secretariat Note of 4 June 2018 to Council’, Doc 
9287/18, 5.
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While the freeze and phase-out is principally origin-neutral, the 
criteria laid down in the Delegated Regulation single out palm oil—
which is virtually not produced in the EU—as the only crop yielding 
high ILUC-risk biofuel. This raises questions as to the compatibility 
of the measure with WTO law. In December 2019, Indonesia re-
quested consultations on the issue with the EU in the WTO.46 As the 
consultations failed to settle the dispute, Indonesia brought a formal 
request for the establishment of a panel in March 2020.47 This com-
plaint illustrates the importance as well as the complexity of the 
issue of sustainable biofuels.48 In the following sections, we analyse 
some key issues which the EU freeze and phase-out of high ILUC-
risk biofuels raises under WTO law.
A comprehensive analysis of all legal issues arising under WTO law 
is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, we focus on three fundamental 
questions.49 First, we analyse whether the freeze and phase-out falls 
within the ambit of the TBT Agreement (Section 4). Concluding that the 
freeze and phase-out is unlikely to qualify as a ‘technical regulation’ and 
therefore does not fall under the TBT Agreement, we then analyse 
whether it is compatible with the basic tenets of GATT non-discrimina-
tion law (Section 5). Finding the measure to be inconsistent with Articles 
I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, we finally turn to the question whether the EU 
measure can be justified under Article XX of the GATT (Section 6).
4  |  TBT AGREEMENT
4.1  |  Scope of application: ‘Technical  
regulation’
The TBT Agreement contains disciplines for a limited class of non-
tariff measures that ‘seem to be different from, and additional to 
the obligations’50 set out in the GATT. It applies to technical regula-
 46European Union – Certain Measures Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels 
(Request for Consultations by Indonesia) WT/DS593/1 (16 December 2019).
 47EU – Palm Oil, Request for the Establishment of a Panel (n 6). While the panel was 
established in July 2020, the dispute is still pending at the time of writing.
 48ibid.
 49For example, we do not address the subsidy issue. For an analysis of EU biofuels policy 
and subsidies see, for example, S Switzer and JA McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – Raising 
Questions of WTO Compatibility’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
713, 718ff. Other issues, such as the sustainability criteria set out in RED II, have already 
been discussed in the context of RED I and, thus, will not be explored in detail. For 
analyses of WTO issues raised by RED I, see, for example, Mignolli (n 3) 236–240; R 
Leal-Arcas and A Filis, ‘Legal Aspects of the Promotion of Renewable Energy within the 
EU in Relation to the EU’s Obligation in the WTO’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and 
Policy Review 3; C Daugbjerg and A Swinbank, ‘The WTO and the EU’s Sustainability 
Criteria for Biofuels (2014) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 429; M Meredith, 
‘Malaysia's World Trade Organization Challenge to the European Union’s Renewable 
Energy Directive: An Economic Analysis’ (2012) 21 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 
399; Douma (n 12); A Mitchell and C Tran, ‘The Consistency of the European Union 
Renewable Energy Directive with World Trade Organization Agreements: The Case of 
Biofuels’ (2010) 1 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 33.
 50European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products 
(Appellate Body Report) WT/DS135/AB/R (5 April 2001) (EC – Asbestos) para 80 
(emphasis in the original). See, for example, P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc, The Law 
and Policy of the World Trade Organization (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 
884; PC Mavroidis, ‘Last Mile for Tuna (to a Safe Harbour): What is the TBT Agreement 
All About?’ (2019) 30 European Journal of International Law 279, 281.
3.3  |  The freeze and phase-out and its trade 
implications
RED II provides for a ‘freeze and phase-out’ of high ILUC-risk crop-
based biofuels in the transport sector. Its full effects result from the 
interplay of several provisions of the RED II and the Commission 
Delegated Regulation 2019/807.41
Article 25(1) RED II requires each Member State to ‘set an obliga-
tion on fuel suppliers to ensure that the minimum share of renewable 
energy within the final consumption of energy in the transport sector is 
at least 14% by 2030’.42 However, the contribution of all crop-based 
biofuels is limited in the calculation of this minimum share. This contri-
bution may be no more than 1% higher than the share of those biofuels 
in the final consumption of energy in the transport sector in the rele-
vant Member State in 2020; in any event, it may not exceed 7%.43
The share of biofuels produced from ‘feedstock for which a sig-
nificant expansion of the production area into land with high-carbon 
stock is observed’ (‘covered high ILUC-risk biofuels’) is further lim-
ited for the purposes of this calculation. It may principally not exceed 
the consumption levels of such biofuels in the Member State in 2019 
(‘freeze’). Additionally, this limit will gradually decrease to zero by 
the end of 2030 (‘phase-out’).
While the freeze and phase-out does not impose an import ban 
on any high ILUC-risk biofuels, it has obvious economic conse-
quences for the covered biofuels. These biofuels will not be eligible 
for support schemes aimed at incentivizing the use of sustainable 
biofuels. Moreover, producers will not profit from the increasing de-
mand for sustainable biofuels (e.g. through mandatory blending im-
posed on fuel suppliers). Rather, the demand for covered high 
ILUC-risk biofuels in the EU is likely to decrease significantly.44
The methodology for identifying biofuels covered by the freeze 
and phase-out is set out in the EC’s Delegated Regulation. The 
Delegated Regulation establishes two cumulative criteria for deter-
mining high ILUC-risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of 
the production area into land with high-carbon stock is observed. 
The first criterion concerns the average annual expansion of the 
global production area of the feedstock. The second criterion ad-
dresses the share of such expansion into land with high-carbon 
stock.45 Based on the figures provided in the Annex to the Delegated 
Regulation, only palm oil qualifies as a high ILUC-risk feedstock. 
Consequently, palm-oil-based biofuels are the only biofuels covered 
by the freeze and phase-out. An exception exists only for palm-oil-
based biofuels certified as low ILUC-risk biofuels.
 41Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/807 of 13 March 2019 relating to the 
determination of high ILUC-risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of the 
production area into land with high-carbon stock is observed [2019] OJ L133/1 
(Delegated Regulation).
 42RED II (n 4) art 25(1).
 43ibid art 26(1).
 44See generally E Webster, ‘Transnational Legal Processes, the EU and RED II: 
Strengthening the Global Governance of Bioenergy‘ (2021 fc) 30 Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law.
 45Delegated Regulation (n 41) art 3.
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to depend on whether it lays down ‘product characteristics’ or 
‘their related PPMs’.
Both terms lack a precise definition and their interpretation is 
subject to much debate. In the following sections, we set out our un-
derstanding of each term before assessing whether the relevant pro-
visions in the RED II and the Delegated Regulation lay down ‘product 
characteristics’ or ‘their related PPMs’—neither of which we find to 
be the case.
4.2  |  ‘Product characteristics’
4.2.1  |  Intrinsic and related characteristics
The exact meaning of the term ‘product characteristics’ is subject to 
much debate. Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement does not specify 
whether the term only refers to physical characteristics or whether 
it also includes certain non-intrinsic properties of a product or (even) 
PPMs.57 According to the Appellate Body (AB), ‘product character-
istics’ within the meaning of Annex 1.1 include ‘any objectively de-
finable “features”, “qualities”, “attributes”, or other “distinguishing 
mark” of a product’ and may, for example, relate to, ‘a product's 
composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, 
flammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity’.58 These examples 
suggest that, in the AB’s view, product characteristics typically con-
cern physical properties, which are intrinsic to a product. However, 
the AB has made clear that product characteristics are not limited to 
intrinsic features and qualities but also include ‘related’ characteris-
tics (not to be confused with ‘related’ PPMs, which are dealt with 
below). Such ‘related’ characteristics include, for example, the 
means of identification, the presentation and the appearance of a 
product.59 While this list is not exhaustive, the ‘related’ characteris-
tics mentioned by the AB have in common that they are ‘discernible 
on the product itself’.60
Moreover, in EC – Seal Products, the AB found that the Panel 
had erred in finding that the contested EU seal regime laid down 
product characteristics. According to the AB, neither the identity 
of the hunter nor the type or purpose of the hunt could be viewed 
as product characteristics.61 None of these features could be de-
tected in or on the respective product. Thus, the AB’s ruling 
 57See, for example, MA Crowley and R Howse, ‘Tuna-Dolphin II: a legal and economic 
analysis of the Appellate Body Report’ (2014) 13 World Trade Review 321, 325–326; M 
Du, ‘What is a “Technical Regulation” in the TBT Agreement?’ (2015) European Journal of 
Risk Regulation 396, 401; Sifonios (n 53) 256.
 58EC – Asbestos (n 50) para 67.
 59ibid. See also L Silveira and T Obersteiner, ‘The Scope of the TBT Agreement in Light of 
Recent WTO Case Law’ (2013) 8 Global Trade and Customs Journal 112, 113ff.
 60G Marín Durán, ‘NTBs and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: The 
Case of PPM-Based Measures Following US – Tuna II and EC – Seal Products’ (2015) 6 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law, 87, 98 (emphasis in the original).
 61European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS400/AB/R; WT/DS401/AB/R (22 May 2014) 
para 5.45. See also R Howse, J Langille and K Sykes, ‘Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s 
Appellate Body Report in EC – Seal Products’ (2014) 18 ASIL Insights.
tions, standards and conformity assessment procedures. Whether 
the freeze and phase-out falls into one of these categories is 
therefore a ‘threshold issue’51 as regards the applicability of the 
TBT Agreement.
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement defines a ‘technical regulation’ 
as a
[d]ocument which lays down product characteris-
tics or their related processes and production meth-
ods, including the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It 
may also include or deal exclusively with terminol-
ogy, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling re-
quirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.52
Broadly speaking, the first sentence concerns technical regulations 
stipulating technical requirements; the second sentence covers man-
datory labelling requirements.53
The freeze and phase-out is not concerned with labelling re-
quirements. Whether it constitutes a ‘technical regulation’ within 
the meaning of Annex 1.1 is subject to a three-tier test: it must 
apply to an identifiable group of products, lay down product char-
acteristics or their related processes and production methods 
(PPMs), and compliance must be mandatory.54 The freeze and 
phase-out arguably applies to an identifiable group of products, 
that is, biofuels.55 Also, compliance is mandatory, as EU Member 
States are required to create an obligation for fuel suppliers to 
ensure the minimum share of renewable energy within the trans-
port sector. Moreover, the share of high ILUC-risk biofuels should 
gradually decrease to zero by the end of 2030.56 Thus, whether 
the freeze and phase-out qualifies as a ‘technical regulation’ seems 
 51EC – Asbestos (n 50) para 59; European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines 
(Appellate Body Report) WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) (EC – Sardines) para 175. 
See also M Matsushita et al, The World Trade Organization – Law Practice and Policy (3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 436ff.
 52While standards differ from technical regulations in being non-mandatory, conformity 
assessment procedures are procedures ‘used, directly or indirectly, to determine that 
relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled’ and thus 
presuppose a technical regulation or standard; see TBT Agreement (n 9) Annex 1.2 and 
1.3, respectively.
 53D Sifonios, Environmental Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law (Springer 
2018) 255.
 54E.g. EC – Sardines (n 51) para 176. P Mavroidis, ‘Driftin’ too Far from Shore – Why the 
Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by the WTO Appellate Body is 
Wrong, and What Should the AB Have Done Instead’ (2013) 12 World Trade Review 509, 
522, argues that the AB’s finding in US – Tuna II (Mexico) (United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (Appellate Body 
Report) WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012), that the United States’ measure was a 
technical regulation, even though tuna could be marketed without the ‘dolphin-safe’ 
label, ‘cannot be right’. See also L Ankersmit and JC Lawrence, ‘The Future of 
Environmental Labelling: US – Tuna II and the Scope of the TBT’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, 127, 133ff.
 55See A Mitchell and D Merriman, ‘Indonesia’s WTO Challenge to the European Union’s 
Renewable Energy Directive: Palm Oil & Indirect Land-Use Change’ (2020 fc) 12 Trade, 
Law and Development 1, 49-50. For the same result in the context of RED I, see Mitchell 
and Tran (n 49) 42.
 56RED II (n 4) art 25.
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4.3  |  ‘or their related PPMs’
4.3.1  |  Product-related and non-product-
related PPMs
The exact meaning of ‘their related PPMs’ in the first sentence of Annex 
1.1 is, again, subject to debate.67 A particularly controversial issue is 
whether the phrase ‘their related PPMs’ covers not only product-related 
PPMs (PR-PPMs) but also non-product-related PPMs (NPR-PPMs).68 
PR-PPMs are characterized as ‘affecting the physical characteristics of 
the final product’.69 Their purpose can be, for example, to ensure a 
product’s functionality or to safeguard consumers. In contrast, NPR-
PPMs are ‘designed to achieve a social purpose’.70 Examples include 
prohibitions on the use of environmentally unfriendly sources of energy 
or child labour in the production of a product.71 Unlike PR-PPMs, these 
NPR-PPMs ‘do not affect the physical characteristics of the final prod-
uct put on the market’.72 Based on the text of Annex 1.1 and the nego-
tiating history,73 it is often considered the prevailing view that the 
phrase ‘their related PPMs’ does not cover NPR PPMs. Thus far, how-
ever, the issue has not been resolved in WTO case law.74
4.3.2  |  Sufficient nexus
The AB interpreted the phrase ‘or their related PPMs’ for the first 
time in EC – Seal Products. It clarified that the phrase ‘indicate[d] 
that the subject matter of a technical regulation may consist of a 
[PPM] that is related to product characteristics’, and thus not to 
the product.75 Moreover, the AB explained that whether a meas-
ure lays down ‘related PPMs’ depends on whether the PPMs pre-
scribed ‘have a sufficient nexus to the characteristics of a 
product’.76 Despite finding that the EU seal regime did not lay 
 67Du (n 57) 401.
 68It is widely recognized that PR-PPMs are subject to the TBT Agreement; see, for example, 
Marín Durán (n 67) 96. For a summary of the debate see, for example, E Vranes, ‘Climate 
Labelling and the WTO: The 2010 EU Ecolabelling Programme as a Test Case under WTO 
Law’ (2011) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 205, 213–214; A Maggio, 
Environmental Policy, Non-Product Related Process and Production Methods and the Law of the 
World Trade Organization (Springer 2017) 172. On the wider debate on NPR-PPMs see, e.g., J 
Pauwelyn, ‘Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms still Haunt the WTO’ 
(2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 575, 585ff.
 69Marín Durán (n 60) 96. See also Sifonios (n 53) 255. S Charnovitz, ‘The Law of 
Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’ (2002) 27 Yale 
Journal of International Law 59, 65, emphasizes that certain PPMs ‘are related to the 
product even though adherence to a particular process may not be directly detectable in 
the product’ (emphasis in the original).
 70Charnovitz (n 69) 65.
 71Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 887.
 72ibid. See also M Joshi, ‘Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization 
Agreements?’ (2004) 38 Journal of World Trade 69, 74.
 73Sceptical as regards the explanatory value of the travaux préparatoires and negotiating 
history see, for example, Marín Durán (n 60) 108.
 74Du (n 57) 401; Sifonios (n 53) 256.
 75EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.12.
 76ibid. See also Du (n 57) 400; J Norpoth, ‘Mysteries of the TBT Agreement Resolved? 
Lessons to Learn for Climate Policies and Developing Country Exporters from Recent 
TBT Disputes’ (2013) Journal of World Trade 575, 578.
implies that the earlier reference to ‘related’ characteristics was 
no ‘invitation to regard all non-intrinsic properties of a product or 
PPMs as “product characteristics”’.62 As Levy and Regan have 
pointed out, such a broad definition of ‘product characteristics’ 
would make the reference to ‘their related PPMs’ in Annex 1.1 
pleonastic, as any measure laying down PPMs would invariably 
also lay down ‘product characteristics’.63 Such an interpretation, 
however, would be at odds with the principle of effective treaty 
interpretation, which requires that every term be given proper 
meaning rather than being deprived of any significance;64 this 
also applies to the interpretation of the provisions of the WTO 
Agreement.65 According to the AB, a treaty interpreter is ‘not free 
to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or 
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.66 As an inter-
pretation conflating PPMs with product characteristics would 
render the clause ‘or their related PPMs’ redundant it should, in 
our view, generally be avoided.
4.2.2  |  Assessment: Does the freeze and phase-out 
lay down ‘product characteristics’?
The relevant provisions in the RED II and the Delegated Regulation 
concern the calculation of EU Member States’ gross final con-
sumption of energy from renewable sources in the transport sec-
tor. The freeze and phase-out does not prohibit the placing of 
any crop-based biofuels on the EU market. Nor does it impose 
requirements concerning the physical characteristics of biofuels 
or related characteristics, such as the labelling of products as 
‘biofuels’. Rather, the freeze and phase-out concerns the extent 
to which covered high ILUC-risk biofuels may be taken into ac-
count when calculating Member States’ minimum shares of re-
newable energy consumption. Moreover, it lays down exceptions 
for low ILUC-risk biofuels, based on specific sustainability criteria 
and additionality criteria, which are mainly concerned with PPMs. 
Neither the criteria for determining high ILUC-risk crops, nor 
the sustainability criteria or the additionality criteria prescribe 
or impose any objectively definable features or qualities or re-
lated characteristics of crop-based biofuels. Thus, in our view, the 
freeze and phase-out cannot be considered to lay down ‘product 
characteristics’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Annex 
1.1. Whether it lays down ‘their related PPMs’ will be addressed 
in the next section.
 62PI Levy and DH Regan, ‘EC – Seal Products: Seals and Sensibilities (TBT Aspects of the 
Panel and Appellate Body Reports)’ (2015) 14 World Trade Review, 337, 354 (emphasis in 
the original).
 63ibid 355.
 64See RK Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 179.
 65See Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/
DS9/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R (4 October 1996) 12.
 66For example, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products 
(Appellate Body Report) WT/DS98/AB/R (14 December 1999) para 80.
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The Delegated Regulation stipulates two cumulative criteria for 
determining high ILUC-risk feedstock.81 The average annual expan-
sion of the global production area of the feedstock since 2008 
must be higher than 1 percent and must affect more than 100,000 
hectares. Moreover, the share of such expansion into land with 
high-carbon stock must be higher than 10 percent, according to a 
formula laid down in Article 3(b) of the Delegated Regulation. 
Importantly, neither of these criteria addresses the biofuel pro-
duction processes of individual producers or of producers in spe-
cific country. Rather, both criteria concern consequences of the 
growth of global agricultural production and the increased de-
mand for different crops from all sectors at an aggregate level. 
Thus, in our view, these criteria cannot be considered as ‘laying 
down’ (i.e. establishing, prescribing) any processes or production 
methods.82 Besides, they also seem completely unrelated to any 
product characteristics of crop-based biofuels. Subsequently, we 
will analyse whether the various criteria for certification of low 
ILUC-risk biofuels lay down ‘related PPMs’.
The sustainability criteria for certification of low ILUC-risk biofu-
els fall into two categories: land-related criteria and emissions-re-
lated criteria. The land-related criteria concern the type of land 
from which the raw material for the production of biofuels is ob-
tained. Article 4(1)(a) of the Delegated Regulation in conjunction 
with Article 29(3)-(5) RED II principally excludes biofuels from 
being certified as low ILUC-risk if raw material is obtained from 
land with a high biodiversity value, land with high-carbon stock 
or land that was peatland in January 2008. However, the fact that 
biofuels are produced, for instance, from land with a high biodiver-
sity value does not seem to have a sufficient nexus to any of their 
intrinsic or related characteristics. Thus, the land-related criteria 
do not lay down ‘related PPMs’.
The emissions-related sustainability criteria concern GHG-
emission savings from the use of biofuels as compared to fossil fuels. 
Article 29(10) RED II prescribes minimum thresholds from 50% to 
65% for biofuels in the transport sector.83 The RED II lays down the 
methodology for calculating the GHG emissions from the produc-
tion and use of biofuels in Part C of Annex V. The total emissions are 
the sum of the emissions from the extraction or cultivation of raw 
materials, (direct) land-use change, processing, transport and distri-
bution, and the fuel in use; deductions are made for emissions sav-
ings from soil carbon accumulation via improved agricultural 
management and carbon dioxide (CO2) capture.
84
The crucial question is whether the emissions-related sustainabil-
ity criteria lay down ‘related PPMs’. When calculating the emissions 
savings, emissions from the whole production process, from transport 
 81Delegated Regulation (n 41) art 1.
 82Lydgate (n 27) 184 emphasizes that ILUC regulations are not based on NPR-PPMs and 
notes that ‘[f]or ILUC regulations, new terminology would be necessary in order to 
extend the concept of process-orientation even further’.
 83The threshold depends on the date when the installation producing the biofuels began 
(or will begin) to operate.
 84Alternatively, Annex V specifies default values for emissions savings for a broad range 
of biofuels, also taking into account various processes and production methods.
down product characteristics, the AB did not examine the logical 
follow-up question, that is, whether it laid down related PPMs. As 
the Panel had not sufficiently explored the issue with the parties, 
the AB refrained from completing the legal analysis, merely noting 
that ‘the line between PPMs that fall, and those that do not fall, 
within the scope of the TBT Agreement raises important systemic 
issues’.77 While this observation underlines that not all PPMs are 
covered by the TBT Agreement, important questions remain unre-
solved. In particular, the AB gives no hint as to what a ‘sufficient 
nexus’ actually requires. Thus, while this criterion potentially al-
lows for a more nuanced assessment of PPMs than the dichotomy 
of PR-PPMs and NPR-PPMs, what exactly constitutes a ‘sufficient 
nexus’ is an open question.
This uncertainty is reinforced by the lack of clarity of the term 
‘product characteristics’, which serves as the reference point for 
‘their related PPMs’. A broad reading of the term ‘product character-
istics’ could, for example, include (certain) non-physical characteris-
tics. Thus, NPR-PPMs could qualify as ‘technical regulations’ if they 
have a sufficient nexus to these broadly defined ‘product character-
istics’.78 However, defined more narrowly (as suggested above), the 
term covers intrinsic physical properties of a product and related 
characteristics, which are detectable in or on the product put on the 
market. Consequently, PPMs that have no ‘sufficient nexus’ to this 
more limited set of characteristics are not covered by the definition 
of a ‘technical regulation’ in the first sentence of Annex 1.1.
In our view, the stricter interpretation is supported by a differ-
ence in the wording of the first and second sentence of Annex 1.1. 
While the first sentence refers to ‘product characteristics’ and ‘their 
related PPMs’, the second sentence more broadly refers to labelling 
requirements applying to ‘a product, process or production method’. 
Indeed, the TBT Agreement has been found to cover labelling re-
quirements, even if they deal with NPR-PPMs.79 In our opinion, this 
is stringent as the label itself constitutes a physical, (quasi-)intrinsic 
characteristic of the product put on the market. Importantly, this is 
the case irrespective of the content or the subject matter the label 
addresses.80 In this respect, however, labelling requirements signifi-
cantly differ from other regulatory measures, which do not ‘incorpo-
rate’ PPMs in the same way and therefore require a separate 
assessment of the ‘sufficient nexus’ to the characteristics of a prod-
uct to establish whether they lay down ‘their related PPMs’.
4.3.3  |  Assessment: Does the freeze and phase-out 
lay down ‘their related PPMs’?
Against this background, we now analyse the extent to which the 
freeze and phase-out lays down PPMs which have a ‘sufficient 
nexus’ to ‘product characteristics’ of crop-based biofuels.
 77EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.69.
 78See Du (n 57) 401.
 79E.g. US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 54).
 80See also Levy and Regan (n 62) 355.
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4.4  |  Conclusion
According to the AB, whether a measure constitutes a ‘technical 
regulation’ requires an analysis on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account the characteristics of the measure as well as its design and 
operation.89 In case of doubt, a measure’s ‘integral and essential’ as-
pects carry most weight, while the legal characterization must even-
tually be made ‘in respect of … the measure as a whole’.90
In our above analysis, we find that the relevant provisions in the RED 
II and the Delegated Regulation do not lay down ‘product characteris-
tics’ or ‘their related PPMs’. This finding is subject to one exception. For 
the purposes of calculating emissions savings, the RED II includes GHG 
emissions created by burning biofuels. Only in this respect, the sustain-
ability criteria actually appear ‘related’ to a product characteristic. 
However, in our view, this is of limited relevance as the emissions result-
ing from the burning of biofuels are considered to be zero, and therefore 
have no impact on the calculation of emissions savings. Consequently, 
we conclude that the freeze and phase-out ‘as a whole’ does not consti-
tute a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of Annex 1.1.91
However, even if the freeze and phase-out is not subject to the 
disciplines of the TBT Agreement, it remains subject to the GATT. 
Thus, in a next step, we analyse the measure in light of key GATT 
non-discrimination disciplines.
5  |  NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE GATT
5.1  |  Legal bases
In our analysis of the EU freeze and phase-out, most-favoured-nation 
treatment and national treatment—the key non-discrimination disci-
plines under GATT Articles I:1 and III:4—are of particular relevance. 
If the EU measure were found to be inconsistent with the obligations 
under either of these provisions, the question arises whether it may 
be justified under the general exceptions in Article XX.
According to the AB, ‘[t]he essence of the non-discrimination ob-
ligations is that like products should be treated equally, irrespective 
of their origin’.92 While both Articles I:1 and III:4 are concerned with 
the equality of competitive opportunities for like products, they pro-
hibit different forms of discrimination.93
Simply put, the obligation to provide most-favoured-nation 
treatment prohibits discrimination ‘between and among like prod-
ucts of different origins’.94 More technically, Article I:1 provides 
that with respect to matters referred to in Article III:4 ‘any 
 89For example, US – Tuna II (Mexico) (n 54) para 188; EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.19.
 90EC – Seal Products (n 61) paras 5.19, 5.29.
 91Mitchell and Merriman (n 55) 54 similarly conclude that ‘the Renewable Energy 
Package is not a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT 
Agreement and is thus not subject to Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of that Agreement’.
 92European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 
(Appellate Body Report) WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 1997) (EC – Bananas III) para 190.
 93EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.82.
 94ibid para 5.79 (emphasis in original).
and distribution and the fuel in use have to be taken into account. In 
our view, GHG emissions created by burning biofuels can be consid-
ered an objectively definable feature of biofuels and thus constitute a 
‘product characteristic’. However, in the calculation of the emissions 
savings, the emissions of the biofuel in use are considered zero as the 
CO2 emitted equals the carbon captured during growth of the feed-
stock. Thus, the GHG emissions created by the use of biofuels are of 
no relevance in terms of total emissions and the emissions savings.85
The remaining criteria relate to biofuel production processes of 
individual producers, as well as transport and distribution. In our 
view, only the former can be considered PPMs. However, PPMs such 
as improved agricultural management or the extraction of methane 
from the emissions of a processing plant are neither related to the 
GHG emissions created by burning biofuels (which we consider a 
‘product characteristic’), nor do they appear to have a sufficient 
nexus to any other characteristics of the final product.86 In light of 
these considerations, we find that the emissions-related sustainabil-
ity criteria do not lay down ‘related PPMs’ within the meaning of the 
first sentence of Annex 1.1.87
Finally, we turn to the so-called additionality criteria. According to 
Article 4(1)(b) of the Delegated Regulation, biofuels may only be cer-
tified as low ILUC-risk biofuels if they have been produced from ad-
ditional feedstock obtained through additionality measures which 
meet the criteria set out in Article 5 of the Delegated Regulation. 
Additionality measures must have been taken no more than 10 years 
before certification and must meet at least one of the following cri-
teria: (i) they become financially attractive or face no barrier pre-
venting their implementation only because the biofuels can be 
counted towards the target for renewable energy under the RED I or 
RED II; (ii) they allow for cultivation of food and feed crops on aban-
doned land or severely degraded land and (iii) they are applied by 
small holders. In our view, all three criteria clearly concern NPR-
PPMs. Neither the financial feasibility of production, nor the type of 
land used for production, nor the identity of the producer seem to 
have a ‘sufficient nexus’ to any intrinsic or related characteristics of 
the biofuels produced. Consequently, we find that none of the addi-
tionality criteria lay down ‘related PPMs’.88
 85For this reason, we also find that the RED II does not ‘lay down’ product characteristics 
with regard to GHG emissions, which result from using the biofuel.
 86Similarly, in the context of RED I, A Lendle and M Schaus, ‘Sustainability Criteria in the 
EU Renewable Energy Directive: Consistent with WTO Rules?’ (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development 2010) 5.
 87On the contrary, Mitchell and Tran (n 49) 42 find (in the context of RED I) that the 
emissions-related sustainability criteria relate to product characteristics and therefore 
‘fall within the definition of Annex 1.1’.
 88Another question is whether the certification regime for low ILUC-risk biofuels sets 
out ‘applicable administrative provisions’ within the meaning of Annex 1.1. In EC – Seal 
Products (n 61) para 5.13, the AB explained that relevant administrative provisions must 
either ‘refer’ to or be ‘relevant’ to product characteristics or their related PPMs. The 
Delegated Regulation requires economic operators to duly collect and thoroughly 
document the evidence needed to identify additional feedstock and substantiate their 
claims. Moreover, it obliges economic operators to submit reliable information, arrange 
for an adequate standard of independent auditing and provide evidence that audits are 
being conducted. In so far as these (administrative) provisions concern the financial 
feasibility of production, the type of land used for production and the identity of the 
producer, they do not seem to refer to product characteristics or their related PPMs.
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Likeness is fundamentally about the existence of a competitive 
relationship between products.101 In determining likeness, GATT/
WTO dispute settlement practice frequently refers to criteria first 
set out in a 1970 report of the Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments. These criteria are ‘the product’s end-uses in a given 
market; consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to 
country; the product’s properties, nature and quality’.102 Another 
relevant aspect may be the products’ tariff classifications.103 
However, all these criteria are relatively basic and do not necessarily 
exhaust the analysis.104
A much-debated issue is the relevance of NPR-PPMs in deter-
mining whether products are ‘like’.105 In our opinion, the ‘traditional 
view’,106 maintaining that differences in NPR-PPMs categorically can 
have no effect on the likeness of products has rightly been criticized 
as ‘hardly defensible’.107 Likeness is about competitive relationships 
and therefore clearly ‘goes beyond the physical characteristics of 
the product’.108 Thus, the relevance of NPR-PPMs ‘requires a more 
nuanced answer’.109 In particular, NPR PPMs, which have a strong 
influence on consumers’ tastes and habits, may affect the competi-
tive relationship between products and thus their likeness.110 
Admittedly, however, this is likely to be the exception rather than the 
rule.111
The freeze and phase-out distinguishes between biofuels pro-
duced from high ILUC-risk feedstock and biofuels produced from 
other food and feed crops, which are associated with no or only a 
low ILUC-risk. The question is therefore whether (some) biofuels 
produced from such different raw materials as cereals, sugar crops 
and oil crops are ‘like products’. The properties, nature and quality of 
the products can serve as a starting point for our analysis.
The AB understands this criterion to cover the physical charac-
teristics and qualities of the products in question.112 It serves as a 
useful—although not decisive—indicator of the likeness of products. 
 101EC – Asbestos (n 50) para 99.
 102Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, para 18.
 103For example, EC – Asbestos (n 50) para 101.
 104G Marceau and JP Trachtmann, ‘A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of 
Domestic Regulation on Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade’ (2014) 48 Journal of World Trade 351, 361.
 105For example, R Howse and D Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory 
Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 249, 249ff.; Charnovitz (n 69) 59ff.; Vranes (n 68) 207; Van den 
Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 318.
 106Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 318. Proponents of such a traditional view argue 
that regulatory distinctions between (otherwise like) products based on for instance 
environmentally friendly or unfriendly PPMs would violate GATT non-discrimination 
disciplines under Articles I:1 and/or III:4 (subject to a justification under Article XX 
GATT); see, for example, T Cottier et al, ‘Energy in WTO Law and Policy’ <https://www.
wto.org/engli sh/res_e/publi catio ns_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_7may10_e.pdf> 20.
 107Vranes (n 68) 222.
 108Charnovitz (n 69) 91.
 109Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 388.
 110J Potts, ‘The Legality of PPMs under the GATT: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Sustainable Trade Policy’ (IISD 2008) 15; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 388ff.
 111Potts (n 110) 15; Vranes (n 68) 223; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 389.
 112EC – Asbestos (n 50) para 110.
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any [Member] 
to any product originating in or destined for any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
[Members]’.95 In our analysis under Article I:1, we will thus focus 
on three main elements: whether the EU measure at issue confers 
an advantage on a product originating in the territory of any WTO 
member and whether this advantage is not extended immediately 
and unconditionally to like products originating in the territory of all 
Members.
The national treatment obligation, in contrast, prohibits discrim-
ination of ‘imported products vis-à-vis like domestic products’.96 
Article III:4 provides that ‘[t]he products of the territory of any 
[Member] imported into the territory of any other [Member] shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use’.97 In our analysis under Article 
III:4, we will thus focus on three main elements: whether the im-
ported and domestic products are like products, whether the mea-
sure at issue is a law, regulation or requirement affecting the internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use and 
whether imported products are accorded less favourable treatment 
than like domestic products.
As likeness is a central criterion under both non-discrimination 
standards, we begin our analysis with this criterion before reviewing 
the specific criteria under each provision.
5.2  |  Likeness
The question whether two products—for example, biofuels produced 
from high ILUC-risk feedstock and biofuels produced from food and 
feed crops with no or only low ILUC-risk—are like products is of utmost 
importance to establish whether differences in treatment violate 
GATT non-discrimination disciplines. However, despite their impor-
tance, the terms ‘like’ or ‘like product’ are not explicitly defined in the 
GATT.98 Importantly, according to the AB’s famous accordion meta-
phor, ‘likeness’ is a relative concept, which ‘stretches and squeezes in 
different places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are ap-
plied’.99 However, while a differentiated ‘like product’ analysis is re-
quired on a case-by-case basis, the analytical approach to the concept 
of likeness in the provisions at issue is largely similar.100
 95GATT (n 10) art I:1.
 96EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.79 (emphasis in original).
 97GATT (n 10) art III:4.
 98See Vranes (n 68) 217.
 99Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 65) 21.
 100For example, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale 
of Tuna and Tuna Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico (Appellate Body 
Report) WT/DS381/AB/RW (20 November 2015) (US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 
– Mexico)) para 7.278. See also Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 318.
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5.3  |  Further criteria under Article I:1 GATT
5.3.1  |  Advantage
The term ‘advantage’ has been interpreted broadly in WTO case 
law.120 The AB has emphasized that Article I:1 refers to ‘any advan-
tage’.121 For example, according to the Panel in Brazil – Taxation, an 
advantage ‘exists when a measure alters the conditions of competi-
tion for certain imported products relative to other like imported 
products’.122 Such an understanding reflects the underlying purpose 
of Article I:1, that is, the preservation of ‘equal competitive opportu-
nities’.123 Examples of advantages include internal tax reductions,124 
the granting of flexibility in import procedures125 or access to certi-
fication procedures.126 By including only certain oil-crop-based bio-
fuels in the calculation of Member States’ minimum share of 
renewable energy within the transport sector, the freeze and phase-
out, in our opinion, clearly confers an advantage on these biofuels 
(depending on the implementation in Member States, for example, 
eligibility for support schemes, mandatory blending requirements).
5.3.2  |  Immediately and unconditionally
While this phrase is mostly considered en bloc, the debate has fo-
cused on the meaning of according an advantage ‘unconditionally’. In 
EC – Seal Products, the AB explained that Article I:1 does not prohibit 
a Member from ‘attaching any conditions to the granting of an “ad-
vantage” [but only] conditions that have a detrimental impact on the 
competitive opportunities for like imported products from any 
Member’.127 Regulatory distinctions between like products are thus 
compatible with Article I:1 as long as they have no negative impact 
on such competitive opportunities.128 As the advantage resulting 
from the freeze and phase-out is likely to negatively impact the com-
petitive opportunities for palm-oil-based biofuels, which are im-
ported from Indonesia and some other WTO Members, we find that 
the advantage is not accorded ‘immediately and unconditionally’.
 120E.g. EC – Bananas III (n 92) para 206.
 121Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Appellate Body Report) 
WT/DS139/AB/R; WT/DS142/AB/R (31 May 2000) para 79; EC – Seal Products (n 61) 
para 5.86.
 122Brazil – Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges (Panel Report) WT/
DS472/R; WT/DS497/R (30 August 2017) (Brazil – Taxation) para 7.1041.
 123EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.87.
 124Brazil – Taxation (n 122) para 7.1043. The AB has found that the claims raised under 
Article I:1 were within the Panel’s terms of reference; Brazil – Certain Measures 
Concerning Taxation and Charges (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS472/AB/R; WT/DS497/
AB/R (13 December 2018) para 5.431.
 125Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Panel Report) WT/
DS366/R (27 April 2009) para 7.352.
 126United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China (Panel Report) 
WT/DS392/R (29 September 2010) para 7.417.
 127EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.88.
 128Unlike under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, whether a detrimental impact stems 
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction is not part of the analysis under 
Article I:1 GATT; EC – Seal Products (n 68) para 5.93.
Thus, even products with quite different physical properties may be 
‘like’, for example, if they are capable of performing similar or identi-
cal end-uses.113
First-generation biofuels produced from different food and feed 
crops include bioethanol and biodiesel. Bioethanol is derived from 
the alcoholic fermentation of sucrose or simple sugars. Crops used 
for bioethanol production include wheat, sugar beet, corn, etc.114 
Biodiesel, on the other hand, is produced from vegetable oils using 
transesterification processes.115 The physical properties of these 
two categories of biofuels differ considerably. Moreover, even the 
physical properties of biodiesel fuels produced from different feed-
stock vary to some degree (e.g. with regard to kinetic viscosity, den-
sity or flash point).116 However, in our view, these differences do not 
per se render the different oil crop-based biofuels ‘unlike’.
At least for biofuels produced from different oil crops, neither 
the products’ end-uses nor consumers’ tastes and habits seem to 
support a finding of their ‘unlikeness’.117 With regard to end-uses 
such as blending with petroleum-based fuels or powering internal 
combustion engines, palm-oil-based biofuels are arguably capable of 
performing the same, or similar, functions as other biofuels pro-
duced from other oil crops. As concerns consumers’ tastes and hab-
its, the crucial question is to what extent biofuels produced from 
different oil crops are substitutable from a consumer 
perspective.118
In our case, ‘consumers’ are primarily the fuel suppliers in EU 
Member States. They are the addressees of any Member State mea-
sures aimed at ensuring the renewables share in the transport sec-
tor. While any assessment of fuel suppliers’ tastes and habits is 
necessarily highly speculative, it seems plausible that their choice 
between different biofuels is mainly based on considerations such as 
availability, price and quality. Moreover, fuel suppliers’ tastes and 
habits may also be shaped by environmental risks associated with a 
product, especially where these risks affect the preferences of their 
customers and the ultimate consumers, which may be influenced by 
the high ILUC-risk associated with a particular biofuel. However, it 
seems unlikely that consumer preferences are so strong that palm-
oil-based biofuels and other oil-crop-based biofuels with the same 
end uses would not be in a competitive relationship and, thus, ‘like’ 
products.119
 113ibid paras 111–112. However, the AB also emphasizes that the examination of the 
different criteria should not be confused.
 114See, for example, A Dembiras, ‘The Importance of Bioethanol and Biodiesel from 
Biomass’ (2008) 3 Energy Sources, Part B, 177, 179.
 115See, for example, M Canakci and H Sanli, ‘Biodiesel Production from Various 
Feedstocks and Their Effects on the Fuel Properties’ (2008) 35 Journal of Industrial 
Microbiology and Biotechnology 431, 432.
 116See, for example, ibid 437.
 117Whether cereal or sugar crop-based biofuels (bioethanol) and oil crop-based biofuels 
(biodiesel) are in a competitive relationship, and thus ‘like’, seems more doubtful. 
However, in the present context, we consider it unnecessary to explore this question 
further.
 118EC – Asbestos (n 50) paras 117, 120.
 119See also Mitchell and Tran (n 55) 37.
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competitive opportunities of imported products vis-à-vis like do-
mestic products.
As a result, we find the freeze and phase-out in its current form 
likely to be inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT, 
which is why we will now address the question whether the mea-
sure can be justified under the general exceptions clause in Article 
XX.137
6  |  ARTICLE X X GAT T
Article XX is crucial for WTO members’ policy space under the 
GATT. It involves a two-tier analysis.138 If a measure can be provi-
sionally justified under one of the subparagraphs (in the concrete 
case, either subparagraphs (b) or (g)) it must, in a second step, be 
appraised under the chapeau of Article XX.
6.1  |  Article XX(b) GATT
Subparagraph (b) covers measures, which are ‘necessary to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health’. Whether the freeze and 
phase-out can be provisionally justified under this provision de-
pends, first, on whether it is designed to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health. According to the RED II and the Delegated 
Regulation, the policy objective behind the freeze and phase-out 
is to reduce GHG emissions in the transport sector which result 
from ILUC and which have the potential to negate some or all GHG 
emissions savings otherwise associated with the use of biofuels.139 
As such, the measure is part of EU efforts to comply with its obli-
gations under the Paris Agreement and to mitigate climate 
change.140 In our view, the freeze and phase-out can at least po-
tentially contribute to these objectives and thus be considered 
designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health. The more 
complex question is then whether the measure is ‘necessary’ to 
achieve the claimed objectives.
Whether a measure is necessary requires the weighing and bal-
ancing of a number of factors, including the relative importance of 
the interests or values furthered by the measure at issue, the mea-
sure’s contribution to achieving its objective, and its trade-restric-
tiveness.141 Moreover, the assessment requires a comparison with 
 137NPR-PPMs are not per se excluded from the scope of Article XX: United States 
– Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Appellate Body Report) WT/
DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998) (US – Shrimp) para 121.
 138United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Appellate Body 
Report) WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996) (US – Gasoline, AB Report) 22; US – Shrimp (n 147) 
para 119. See, e.g., Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 554–556.
 139E.g., RED II (n 4) recitals 2, 81; Delegated Regulation (n 41) recitals 7–9.
 140Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 
55 ILM 740.
 141Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Appellate Body Report) WT/
DS332/AB/R (3 December 2007) (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres) para 178. See, e.g., S 
Charnovitz, ‘The WTO’s Environmental Progress’ (2007) 10 Journal of International 
Economic Law 685, 698.
5.4  |  Further criteria under Article III:4 GATT
5.4.1  |  Laws, regulations or requirements affecting…
In its 2018 report in EU – Energy Package, the Panel found that an EU 
directive can be challenged under Article III:4 GATT even though 
Member States have some discretion in transposing the Directive.129 
Thus, neither the RED II nor the Delegated Regulation are beyond 
the scope of Article III:4 GATT.
According to the AB, the term ‘affecting’ indicates that Article 
III:4 has a ‘broad scope of application’.130 It implies that a law or reg-
ulation ‘has an effect on’ a product.131 In our view, the RED II and the 
Delegated Regulation affect palm-oil-based biofuels as the freeze 
and phase-out creates an incentive for fuel suppliers not to use 
these biofuels unless they have been certified as low ILUC-risk.
5.4.2  |  Treatment no less favourable
Article III:4 seeks to ensure ‘effective equality of competitive op-
portunities for imported products’.132 Thus, less favourable treat-
ment occurs where a measure modifies the conditions of 
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported 
products.133 Importantly, it is for the complaining WTO Member 
to ‘establish that the measure accords to the group of “like” im-
ported products “less favourable treatment” than it accords to the 
group of “like” domestic products’.134 A finding of less favourable 
treatment requires a ‘careful analysis of the contested measure’, 
but not necessarily ‘actual effects … in the marketplace’.135 
However, there has to be ‘a genuine relationship between the 
measure at issue and the adverse impact on imported versus like 
domestic products’.136
Based on the criteria for determining high ILUC-risk biofuels, 
only (typically imported) palm-oil-based biofuels are affected by 
the freeze and phase-out (unless certified as low ILUC-risk). By 
contrast, biofuels based on oil crops, which are more likely to be 
produced domestically, such as sunflower or rapeseed, are not 
subject to the freeze and phase out. Thus, while origin-neutral on 
its face, the EU measure—de facto—has an adverse impact on the 
 129European Union and its Member States – Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector 
(Panel Report) WT/DS476/R (10 August 2018) paras 7.393–7.395 (appeal pending).
 130United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” – Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by the European Communities (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS108/AB/RW (14 
January 2002) (US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)) para 210.
 131See, in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, AB EC – Bananas 
III (n 92) para 220.
 132EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.101.
 133E.g. Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Appellate 
Body Report) WT/DS161/AB/R; WT/DS169/AB/R (11 December 2001) (Korea – Beef) 
para 135; US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico) (n 100) para 7.278.
 134EC – Asbestos (n 50) para 100.
 135US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) (n 130) para 215.
 136Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Appellate 
Body Report) WT/DS371/AB/R (17 June 2011) para 134.
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modelling. However, while the Commission concedes that such 
modelling ‘has a number of limitations’, it considers it ‘robust enough 
to show the risk of ILUC associated with conventional biofuels’.151
In recital 81 of the RED II, the EU legislator points out that re-
search has shown that the risks arising from ILUC depend on a vari-
ety of factors and that the highest risks of ILUC have been identified 
for biofuels produced from feedstock for which a significant expan-
sion of the production area into land with high-carbon stock is ob-
served. As regards the significance of the land expansion, the 
Delegated Regulation relies on three factors: (i) the absolute and 
relative magnitude of the land expansion since a specific reference 
year compared to the total production area of the relevant crop; (ii) 
the share of this expansion into land with high-carbon stock and (iii) 
the type of high-carbon stock land.152
According to its 2019 report, the Commission has set these crite-
ria for identifying high ILUC-risk biofuels based on extensive re-
search, including a review of the relevant scientific literature and a 
global assessment based on GIS (Geographic Information System) 
data.153 Thus, assuming that the scientific evidence which supports 
the choice of criteria and methodology to determine the significance 
of the expansion is conclusive, the freeze and phase-out appears ‘apt 
to make a material contribution’ to the reduction of GHG emissions 
resulting from ILUC.154 It arguably does so by discouraging the use 
of high ILUC-risk biofuels with the potential to negate some or all 
GHG emissions savings otherwise associated with their use.
Third, as regards trade-restrictiveness, it should be noted that 
the freeze and phase-out does not impose an import ban on palm oil 
or palm-oil-based biofuels (or any other high ILUC-risk biofuels). It 
also provides an exemption for certified low ILUC-risk biofuels. 
However, the measure caps the share of palm-oil-based biofuels for 
the calculation of Member States’ renewable energy consumption in 
the transport sector at the level of consumption in 2019 and gradu-
ally reduces this share to zero by 2030. The trade-restrictiveness of 
the EU measure is primarily explained by the fact that the economic 
viability of biofuels largely depends on financial support or regula-
tory measures prescribing demand, such as blending requirements 
imposed on fuel suppliers. Thus, by gradually reducing the share of 
palm-oil-based biofuels in the calculation of renewable energy tar-
gets, they are increasingly less likely to benefit from these 
 151ibid 4; Commission (EU) (n 33) 29.
 152Delegated Regulation (n 41) recital 9. See also Commission (EU), Food and Feed Crops 
Report (n 17) 12–14.
 153Commission (EU), Food and Feed Crops Report (n 17) 6. See also CD Ehlermann and N 
Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law’ (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic 
Law, 491, 519, who note based on the AB’s report in EC – Asbestos (n 50) that ‘in making 
policy choices under Article XX, a Member need not rely on the “majority scientific 
opinion” but may rely on a divergent opinion’.
 154For a summary, see Commission (EU), Food and Feed Crops Report (n 17). Mitchell 
and Merriman (n 55) 33, point out the importance for the EU to ‘demonstrate that the 
historical association between palm oil and ILUC is relevant currently’ (emphasis in the 
original). In this regard, Article 7 of the Delegated Regulation deserves mention. 
According to this provision, the European Commission has to review all relevant aspects 
of the report on feedstock expansion, including the data on feedstock expansion by 30 
June 2021 and thereafter in light of evolving circumstances and latest available scientific 
evidence, and—if appropriate—has to amend the Delegated Regulation.
possible alternative measures, ‘which may be less trade restrictive 
while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective’.142
According to the AB, assessing the necessity of a measure re-
quires a ‘holistic operation that involves putting all the variables of 
the equation together and evaluating them in relation to each 
other after having examined them individually’.143 However, in the 
following, we limit our analysis to some considerations that seem 
particularly relevant for the assessment of the measure’s 
necessity.144
First, as regard the relative importance of the interests at stake: 
the freeze and phase-out aims to reduce GHG emissions resulting 
from ILUC. In light of global efforts to reduce GHG emissions and 
mitigate climate change, the interests at stake do appear vital.145 
This is relevant for the overall assessment, as a measure is more 
likely to be considered necessary if the underlying interests or val-
ues are of high importance.
Second, the measure’s contribution to achieving the objectives 
identified is an important element. Simply put, the larger its contri-
bution, the more likely a measure is to be considered necessary.146 
However, the extent to which the freeze and phase-out contributes 
to reducing GHG emissions from ILUC and mitigating climate change 
is an open and complex question. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the AB 
recognized that in the context of complex environmental problems, 
such as climate change, isolating the contribution of one specific 
measure is difficult in the short term.147 In this case, a measure’s ne-
cessity can be established, for example, by showing that it ‘is apt to 
produce a material contribution to the achievement of its objec-
tive’.148 This aptitude may be demonstrated through ‘quantitative 
projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of 
hypotheses that are tested and supported by sufficient 
evidence’.149
In the context of the freeze and phase-out, substantiating the 
measure’s contribution to reducing GHG emissions from ILUC poses 
specific challenges. While the occurrence of ILUC is intuitively plau-
sible,150 quantifying ILUC is notoriously difficult. According to a re-
cent report by the European Commission, ILUC ‘cannot be observed 
or measured’ and any estimation of the potential impacts requires 
 142Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 141) para 178.
 143ibid para 182; Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and 
Footwear (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS461/AB/R (7 June 2016) (Colombia – Textiles) 
para 5.75.
 144See further Marceau and Trachtmann (n 104) 370ff.
 145In Brazil – Taxation (n 122) para 7.916, the Panel found that the reduction of CO2 
emissions is an interest of high importance.
 146Korea – Beef (n 133) para 163; Colombia – Textiles (n 143) para 5.72.
 147Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 141) para 151.
 148ibid.
 149ibid.
 150If agricultural land previously used for food and feed production is used to produce 
crops for biofuels, the food and feed demand still needs to be satisfied. This can be done 
through intensifying production in existing agricultural land or by expanding agricultural 
production into previously non-agricultural land, that is, ILUC. See Commission (EU), 
Food and Feed Crops Report (n 17) 3.
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system and the Earth’s atmosphere.163 The term ‘conservation’ 
means ‘the preservation of the environment, especially of natural 
resources’.164 A measure relates to conservation if there is ‘a close 
and genuine relationship of ends and means’.165 In other words, the 
measure must be reasonably related to the conservation 
objective.166
Compared to the necessity test under subparagraph (b), the ‘re-
lating to’ requirement is considered less demanding.167 A measure, 
however, that is ‘merely incidentally or inadvertently’ aimed at a con-
servation objective would not satisfy this requirement.168 In practi-
cal terms, the focus is often on the design and structure of the 
measure at issue.169 An examination of the measure’s empirical or 
actual effects is not required.170
The freeze and phase-out is part of the EU’s efforts to promote 
the use of renewable energy to reduce GHG emissions and comply 
with its commitments under the Paris Agreement. While the actual 
effects of the freeze and phase-out are highly uncertain, its design 
and structure arguably aim to promote the use of biofuels with a 
lower risk of GHG emissions resulting from ILUC. In our view, this 
is sufficient to find that the freeze and phase-out ‘relates to’ the 
conservation of the global atmosphere as an exhaustible natural 
resource.
However, whether a measure can be justified under Article XX(g) 
requires a ‘holistic assessment of its component elements’.171 In ad-
dition to the requirement that a measure relates to the conservation 
of an exhaustible natural resource, subparagraph (g) also requires 
that such conservation measures are ‘made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’.
In light of the AB’s case law, the clause ‘made in conjunction with’ 
stipulates a requirement of ‘even-handedness’, ensuring that restric-
tions are not solely imposed on international trade but also on do-
mestic production or consumption.172 In other words, ‘when 
GATT-inconsistent measures are in place, effective restrictions must 
 163See Mitchell and Tran (n 49) 41; A do Amaral Júnior and C Kramer, ‘WTO as a 
Self-Limited Regime: The Case of Article XX’ in A do Amaral Júnior, LM de Oliveire Sá 
Pires and C Lucena Carneiro (eds), The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism – A Developing 
Country Perspective (Springer 2019) 69, 75. In US – Gasoline, the Panel considered clean 
air as an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g), WTO, United 
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Panel Report) WT/DS2/R 
(29 January 1996) para 6.37.
 164China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (Appellate Body 
Report) WT/DS394/AB/R; WT/DS395/AB/R; WT/DS398/AB/R (30 January 2012) para 
355.
 165China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum 
(Appellate Body Report) WT/DS431/AB/R; WT/DS432/AB/R; WT/DS433/AB/R (7 
August 2014) (China – Rare Earths) para 5.90.
 166Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 50) 576.
 167China – Rare Earths (n 165) para 5.87. See also PC Mavroidis and J de Melo, ‘Climate 
Change Policies and the WTO: Greening the GATT, Revisited’ in S Barrett, C Carraro and 
J de Melo (eds), Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime (CEPR Press and Ferdi 
2015) 225, 230.




 172US – Gasoline, AB Report (n 138) 21; China – Rare Earths (n 165) para 5.93.
mechanisms. In this way, the freeze and phase-out will have a signif-
icant impact on the volume of palm-oil-based biofuel imports into 
the EU. Therefore, even though the measure does not impose an 
import ban, its restrictive effects on international trade are quite se-
vere. Harking back to the measure’s contribution to the achievement 
of its objectives, this finding underlines the importance for the EU to 
show that the contribution of the freeze and phase-out is ‘material’ 
and not only ‘marginal’ or ‘insignificant’.155
Finally, the question arises whether less trade-restrictive alter-
natives to the freeze and phase-out are reasonably available to the 
EU. Any alternative has to allow the EU to achieve the same level of 
protection and must not be ‘merely theoretical in nature’ or unduly 
burdensome, for example, by imposing ‘prohibitive costs or substan-
tial technical difficulties’.156 For example, a voluntary labelling re-
gime may be less trade-restrictive but would arguably not allow for 
the same level of environmental protection.157 Another potential al-
ternative, recently considered by Mitchell and Merriman, is a ‘tracing 
and verification mechanism’, which could allow for a closer tracking 
of the ‘association between a given consignment [of biofuel] and 
ILUC risk’.158 However, Mitchell and Merriman also identify several 
issues that cast doubt on whether such a mechanism would actually 
provide a reasonably available and less trade restrictive alterna-
tive.159 In our view, the most serious constraint for such a tracing and 
verification mechanism seems to be that ILUC is a ‘macro-level prob-
lem’,160 which cannot be directly observed, measured or attributed 
to specific producers.161 In the pending dispute, it would be for 
Indonesia to identify possible alternatives to the freeze and phase-
out, which provide an equivalent contribution to the achievement of 
the objective. In turn, the EU would have to demonstrate that the 
proposed measures are not genuine alternatives or not reasonably 
available.
6.2  |  Article XX(g) GATT
Subparagraph (g) covers measures ‘relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion’. ‘Natural resources’ is a generic term which the AB considers ‘by 
definition, evolutionary’.162 It arguably includes the global climate 
 155Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 141) para 150.
 156ibid para 156; Colombia – Textiles (n 143) para 5.74.
 157Importantly, WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection of 
health or the environment that they consider appropriate. Other WTO members can 
argue that the measure is not necessary to achieve this level of protection, but cannot 
challenge the level of protection as such. See EC – Asbestos (n 54) para 168. See also DH 
Regan, ‘The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth 
of Cost-Benefit Balancing’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 347, 348.
 158Mitchell and Merriman (n 55) 35–36.
 159ibid 36–37.
 160Lydgate (n 27) 168.
 161See Commission (EU), Food and Feed Crops Report (n 17) 4; Jansson and Kalimo (n 19) 
133.
 162US – Shrimp (n 137) para 130. See also Charnovitz (n 141) 700.
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sionally justified are ‘applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade’. In view of its express terms, the chapeau is concerned with 
the application of a measure provisionally justified under one of the 
subparagraphs. However, in the absence of any empirical evidence 
on its application—as is the case with the freeze and phase-out—a 
measure’s ‘actual or expected application’ can also be assessed 
based on its ‘design, architecture, and revealing structure’.178
With regard to the first alternative addressed in the chapeau, the 
AB has identified three analytical elements: (i) the application of the 
measure results in discrimination; (ii) the discrimination occurs be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail and (iii) the dis-
crimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable.179 As regards the first 
element, the Delegated Regulation effectively singles out palm-oil-
based biofuels as the only oil-crop-based biofuels which are subject 
to the freeze and phase-out. Since palm-oil-based biofuels are pre-
dominantly imported from Indonesia, Malaysia and some other 
WTO members, the application of the measure will have disparate 
economic impacts on some producer countries of oil-crop-based 
biofuels, thus resulting in discrimination. As regards the second ele-
ment, we consider the relevant condition to be the occurrence of 
GHG emissions resulting from ILUC.180 ILUC does not necessarily 
occur in the same countries that produce specific oil-crop-based bio-
fuels. Rather, it is a global phenomenon which cannot be directly 
observed or measured and which is driven by changes in demand for 
agricultural commodities in global markets. Thus, in our view, the 
same conditions potentially prevail in any country.181
The measure’s justification seems to depend on the third ele-
ment, that is, whether the discrimination is ‘arbitrary or unjustifi-
able’. According to the AB, the focus of the multifaceted analysis lies 
‘on the cause of the discrimination, or the rationale put forward to 
explain its existence’.182 Discrimination is deemed arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable if it ‘bear[s] no rational connection to the [policy] objective’ 
or ‘would go against that objective’.183 Thus, with regard to the 
freeze and phase-out it is crucial whether the discrimination be-
tween different food and feed crops based on the associated (higher 
or lower) ILUC-risk ‘can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to’ 
the policy objective relied on, that is, the reduction of GHG emis-
sions resulting from ILUC.184
The difficulty in deciding this question is that palm oil is singled 
out vis-à-vis soy and other oil-crop-based biofuels, which may also 
 178E.g., EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.302; see, e.g., Bartels (n 176) 101.
 179US – Shrimp (n 137) paras 150.
 180According to the AB, the relevant ‘conditions’ should be understood ‘by reference to 
the applicable subparagraph of Article XX under which the measure was provisionally 
justified and the substantive obligations under the GATT 1994 with which a violation has 
been found’; EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.301.
 181It should also be noted that a respondent that claims that the conditions are not the 
‘same’ but relevantly different, bears the burden of proof; ibid para 5.301.
 182Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (n 141) para 226.
 183ibid para 227.
 184EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.306; US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico) (n 
100) para 7.316.
also be imposed on domestic production or consumption’.173 While 
the burden of conservation must not be distributed evenly between 
foreign producers and domestic producers or consumers, the AB has 
emphasized that a measure imposing a ‘significantly more onerous 
burden’ on foreign producers is unlikely to qualify for justification 
under subparagraph (g).174
Whether the freeze and phase-out can be considered as even-
handed arguably depends on whether it imposes effective re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption. In our view, 
restrictions on the domestic consumption of high ILUC-risk bio-
fuels result (indirectly) from the combination of the fuel suppliers’ 
obligation to ensure a minimum share of renewable energy and the 
detailed rules on calculating this minimum share within the final con-
sumption. Despite these restrictions, the burden of conservation is 
largely put on foreign producers of palm oil and palm-oil-based bio-
fuels. However, in light of the AB’s decision in China – Rare Earths, it 
is not entirely clear whether this disparate impact is enough to rule 
out the even-handedness of the measure at issue.
In this case, the AB observed that interpreting subparagraph (g) 
as requiring an analysis of whether the burden of conservation is 
evenly distributed ‘could entail a duplication of the analysis to be 
conducted under the chapeau, in particular in cases involving dis-
criminatory measures. This would not comport with the principle of 
effective treaty interpretation’.175 In our view, assessing the discrim-
inatory features of the measure under the subparagraph would not 
only risk duplicating but also undermining the analysis under the 
chapeau. As Bartels has pointed out, the chapeau ‘contains a discrim-
ination condition, which … is subject to two independent justifica-
tions’.176 If the issue of discrimination is considered under the 
subparagraph rather than the chapeau, these justifications would be 
rendered virtually ineffective.
In short, the provisional justification of the freeze and phase-out 
under subparagraphs (b) and (g) raises a host of complex questions. 
Based on the above analysis, we find that a provisional justification 
of the freeze and phase-out appears not to be precluded under ei-
ther subparagraph (b) or (g). Against this background, we now turn 
to the chapeau of Article XX.
6.3  |  Article XX chapeau
The second step of the two-tier analysis under Article XX consists of 
an appraisal of the measure under the chapeau, whose function is to 
prevent the abuse or misuse of the exceptions specified in the sub-
paragraphs.177 Such abuse or misuse occurs when measures provi-
 173China – Rare Earths (n 165) para 5.136.
 174ibid para 5.134.
 175ibid para 5.135.
 176L Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS 
Agreements: A Reconstruction’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 95, 
108.
 177US – Gasoline, AB Report (n 138) 22; US – Shrimp (n 137) paras 157–159; Brazil 
– Retreaded Tyres (n 141) para 227.
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biofuels produced from food and feed crops (without any reduction 
targets) but stated that ‘[t]he contribution from biofuels … produced 
from palm oil shall be 0 % from 2021’.190 While the EP’s proposal was 
seen as ‘rais[ing] substantive concerns, in terms both of compatibil-
ity with the EU’s obligations in the [WTO] and of trade relations with 
palm oil producing countries’,191 the treatment of first-generation 
biofuels, including palm oil, remained a thorny issue in the subse-
quent trilogue phase of the legislative process.192
Against this background, the freeze and phase-out appears as 
an attempt to square the circle and reconcile the political demands 
channelled through the Parliament with the obligations of the EU 
under WTO law. However, in light of the legislative history, the fact 
that the freeze and phase-out only affects palm-oil-based biofuels 
gives the impression that the measure was specifically designed to 
target these particular biofuels. If this were the case, the resulting 
discrimination would arguably not be ‘merely inadvertent or un-
avoidable’ but rather ‘foreseen’ and deliberate in nature, and thus 
‘unjustifiable’. As a result, the freeze and phase-out in its current 
form could not be justified under Article XX.
7  |  CONCLUSION
The EU freeze and phase-out of certain crop-based biofuels seems 
carefully crafted to avoid potential WTO pitfalls, such as the applica-
bility of the TBT Agreement. However, we find the measure likely to 
be inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT and are scepti-
cal whether it can be justified under Article XX. In light of the leg-
islative history, the fact that the freeze and phase-out only affects 
palm-oil-based biofuels suggests that the resulting discrimination 
was not ‘merely inadvertent or unavoidable’. Such deliberate dis-
crimination appears ‘unjustifiable’ under the chapeau of Article XX.
As a result, the freeze and phase-out established by the RED 
II could—in its current form—not be justified under Article XX. At 
the same time, we find that—assuming the scientific evidence on 
ILUC is reliable—a measure like the freeze and phase-out of biofuels 
because of their negative climate effects is ‘apt to make a material 
contribution’ to climate change mitigation. Thus, in the absence of 
any deliberate discrimination, it seems principally justifiable under 
Article XX.
However, even if designed in a WTO-consistent manner, curbing 
the use of some crop-based biofuels will not suffice to bring about 
a substantial decarbonization and a fundamental transformation of 
the transport sector, which is much needed to tackle the climate cri-
sis. Instead, the dispute over the RED II highlights the limitations of 
a ‘market-based’ climate policy instrument, and the need to address 
climate policy as a challenge requiring profound policy change.
 190European Parliament (n 38).
 191Letter from EC Director-General for Trade, Jean-Luc Demarty (n40).
 192See Council (EU) (n 39) and (n 40).
lead to GHG emissions resulting from ILUC. It should be recalled that 
the freeze and phase-out is based on the premise that the highest 
ILUC-risks have been identified for biofuels produced from feed-
stock for which a significant expansion of the production area into 
land with high-carbon stock is observed. As mentioned above, ac-
cording to its 2019 report, the European Commission has set the 
criteria for identifying high ILUC-risk biofuels based on extensive 
research, including a review of the relevant scientific literature and a 
global assessment based on GIS data.185 Thus, in the absence of sci-
entific evidence undermining the choice of criteria and the method-
ology applied, the resulting discrimination, in our view, would appear 
‘rationally related’ to the objective of reducing GHG emissions re-
sulting from ILUC.
However, while ‘one of the most important factors’,186 this ratio-
nal relation is by no means the only relevant factor in the assessment 
of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. In our view, at least two 
more factors identified in the AB’s case law cast doubt on the justifi-
ability of the discrimination. In US – Shrimp, the AB criticized the fail-
ure of the US to make serious good faith efforts to negotiate and 
conclude a multilateral agreement before resorting to unilateral 
measures.187 The AB specifically pointed out the importance of such 
efforts where the policy objective of the measure concerns trans-
boundary or global environmental problems that call for ‘concerted 
and cooperative efforts’ of a large number of countries. The reduc-
tion of GHG emissions resulting from ILUC clearly concerns a global 
environmental problem. Whether the EU has engaged sufficiently in 
efforts to find a multilateral solution prior to imposing the freeze and 
phase-out seems at least doubtful.
The second, arguably even more problematic, aspect concerns 
the seemingly deliberate nature of the discrimination. In US – 
Gasoline, the AB criticized that the discrimination resulting from the 
measure at issue ‘must have been foreseen, and was not merely in-
advertent or unavoidable’ and was therefore ‘unjustifiable’.188 In our 
view, this factor has to be assessed in light of the legislative process 
that led to the adoption of the RED II.
In its initial proposal for the RED II, the Commission had pro-
posed a maximum share of crop-based biofuels, which would have 
counted towards a Member State’s renewable energy target in the 
transport sector and would have decreased from 7% to 3.8% in 
2030. While biofuels not fulfilling the sustainability and GHG emis-
sions saving criteria would not have been taken into account in the 
calculation, the cap would have applied to any biofuels produced 
from food or feed crops.189 However, as explained above, the 
European Parliament vehemently opposed the Commission’s ap-
proach. An amendment to the Commission’s initial proposal adopted 
by the plenary of the Parliament provided for a general 7% ceiling for 
 185Commission (EU), Food and Feed Crops Report (n 17) 6.
 186EC – Seal Products (n 61) para 5.306.
 187US – Shrimp (n 137) para 166; but see also United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia (Appellate 
Body Report) WT/DS58/AB/RW (22 October 2001) paras 115–134.
 188US – Gasoline, AB Report (n 138) 28–29.
 189Commission (EU) (n 34) 71 (art 7).
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